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Leverage and Productivity Growth in Emerging 
Economies: Is There A Threshold Effect? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
While credit is essential for investment, innovation and economic growth, the 
current economic crisis has highlighted the risks of lending booms around the world. 
Economists have long recognized that financial conditions in the private sector could 
have a powerful effect on macroeconomic outcomes. Increases in leverage can lead to 
greater probability of default, and in turn higher costs of external financing. This 
could lower investment, cash flow and therefore output (Kyotaki and Moore, 1997). 
Increases in corporate leverage could also induce severe slowdowns by amplifying 
and propagating adverse shocks on the real economy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
However lending booms may be a natural consequence of financial and economic 
development. Hence, the problem for most policy makers is to identify the point 
beyond which further increases in private sector indebtedness become a cause for 
concern. In other words, policy makers need to be able to assess the sustainability of 
leverage, both in order to prevent similar crises in the future and to identify those 
firms or sectors of the economy that need to go through a deleveraging process 
following the crisis.   
The macroeconomic literature on lending booms has generally focused on 
aggregate measures of indebtedness such as various debt to GDP ratios (e.g., see 
Gourinchas et al. (2001)). In the same vein, the literature on early warning systems 
aims at assessing a country’s vulnerability to currency crises (e.g., see Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999); it allows policy makers to detect underlying economic weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities using various aggregate indicators. These measures are often too 
crude to help policy-makers judge whether current levels of leverage in a firm or in a 
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given sector of the economy are sustainable.  In contrast to much of this literature, 
we focus our attention on some microeconomic aspects of lending booms, namely 
the sustainability of leverage in the corporate sector in terms of its implications for 
total factor productivity growth. Specifically, we explore the possible adverse effects 
of excess leverage on total factor productivity growth. Most importantly, we 
endogenously identify a threshold level of leverage beyond which further increases in 
indebtedness result in lower TFP growth. Whether a firm is below or above the 
threshold can be seen as a measure of “sustainability” of a firm’s leverage.  
The channel between leverage and productivity has remained virtually 
unexplored. Corporate leverage decisions are among the most important decisions 
made by firm executives. Since Modigliani and Miller (1958), research has focused 
on understanding corporate financial choices and policies around the world, 
especially in the US. This literature highlights the firm, market and industry 
characteristics determining optimal leverage and also its dynamic adjustment process 
in case of a departure from the optimal (e.g., see Fischer, et al, 1989; Goldstein, Ju 
and Leland 2001; Strebulaev 2007). A parallel literature on financial institutions has 
also paid attention to different aspects of loans and cost inefficiencies (e.g., see 
Berger and Humphrey 1992; Bonin et al. 2005). While there exists a limited 
literature on the relationship between leverage and firm value/performance (e.g., 
McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Berger and di Patti 2006; Driffield, Mahambare and 
Pal, 2007), there is very little, if at all, understanding as to how leverage can affect 
productivity growth.1 
Higher leverage may reduce the agency costs of outside equity, and increase 
firm value and efficiency by encouraging managers to act in the interest of 
                                                 
1 Mendoza and Terrones (2008) analyze microeconomic data and show that during episodes of credit boom 
leverage at the firm level tends to sharply increase. Their sample is limited to publicly quoted firms and, 
moreover, they do not analyze the effects of this increase in leverage on firms’ productivity.  
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shareholders (McConnell and Servaes, 1995).2 Thus, higher leverage is likely to be 
associated with higher total factor productivity (TFP) growth. We argue that the 
relationship between leverage and productivity growth is likely to be non-linear: 
while moderate leverage could undoubtedly boost TFP and therefore the level of 
output, excessive leverage may be responsible for an economy’s vulnerability to 
adverse shocks, e.g. shortfalls in demand or sharp increases in interest rates. 
Overleveraged firms may have to focus on cash flow generation in order to service 
their debts, rather than continued improvements in productivity. Moreover,  
excessive leverage could create excess capacity and lead to financial distress and a 
wave of bankruptcies in response to unexpected adverse shocks (Greenspan, 2002).  
 Our analysis is based primarily on firm-level data from a group of central and 
eastern European (CEE) transition countries (see section 2). This region is an 
important case in point for several reasons. Even after more than a decade of 
reforms, there is a growing feeling that the reforms have failed to spur adequately the 
development of corporate financing opportunities in central and eastern European 
(CEE) countries. While a significant proportion of firms still today do not have any 
access to bank loans, many firms with access to bank loans tend to have loans much in 
excess of their assets (see further discussion in section 2.2). The recent global crisis 
has led to extraordinarily sharp output declines since late 2008. While by the third 
quarter of 2009 there were some signs of a mild recovery, unemployment and the 
volume of non-performing loans are expected to rise for several quarters to come, 
complicating and slowing the recovery in many countries, thus justifying our interest 
in the region.  
Unlike much of the literature for developed countries, the literature on 
capital structure for developing and transition countries has highlighted the 
                                                 
2 There can also be reverse causation. For example, more efficient firms may choose lower equity ratios (i.e., higher 
debt) than others, all else equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of financial distress and 
bankruptcy (Berger and di Patti, 2006).  
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importance of excess leverage (e.g., see Driffield and Pal, 2010). An important 
aspect of our analysis is to analyze the potential relationship between the emergence 
of excessive leverage in the corporate sector and the level of financial market 
development in the sample countries.  It has indeed become clear that weaknesses in 
financial sector operations and management have been a major factor contributing to 
the current financial crisis. We use the Financial Sector Development Indicators, in 
short, FSDI (see World Bank 2006), focusing particularly on indices of banking 
efficiency and stock market capitalisation (see section 2). A better understanding of 
the causes and implications of leverage imbalances for TFP growth is important, 
especially in the wake of the current credit crisis and the deleveraging process that 
might ensue. The identification of a threshold level of leverage beyond which total 
factor productivity growth declines has relevant policy implications.3 Using a 
nonlinear threshold model, the paper provides an analysis of debt sustainability at the 
firm level. 
There is evidence from our analysis that TFP growth increases with leverage 
only up to a certain point. However, beyond a critical threshold, greater leverage 
lowers TFP growth, even after controlling for various firm-level and institutional 
characteristics. Results also highlight the beneficial role of greater financial market 
development, as reflected in the positive effects of higher bank efficiency and market 
capitalisation on TFP growth. More importantly, the model enables us to  
endogenously determine some leverage thresholds beyond which further increases in 
leverage lowers total factor productivity growth, which in turn can be useful for 
formulating policy tools. It also helps to identify certain groups of firms in a given 
country that need to go through a deleveraging process. Indeed, it is important that 
“virtuous” firms, possibly with high but sustainable levels of debt, are not deprived of 
                                                 
3 A policy-oriented publication like the Transition Report (see EBRD 2009, P. 69-70) used our threshold analysis to 
assess the relationship between excess leverage and financial integration. 
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external finance. Our results are robust to alternative specifications and also to use of 
various sub-samples. Our methodology is general and could be applied to other 
regions and thus have wider potential implications.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
discuss the variables and data set. In Section 3, we discuss the empirical methodology 
and present our empirical results. Section 4 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Data Description 
Data used for the analysis is primarily taken from Orbis, a rich firm-level dataset, 
which is provided by Bureau van Dijk electronic publishing. Firm-level data have 
been supplemented by country-level data from the EBRD and the World Bank. The 
World Bank (2006) has developed a range of indices to measure the size, efficiency 
and stability of the banking sector and equity market for a cross section of countries  
for the period 2001-2005. These are commonly known as the Financial Services 
Development Indices, FSDI in short.  
Our sample consists of manufacturing firms from twelve transition countries, 
namely Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine over the period 2001-
2005. The choice of sample period has been dictated by the fact that FSDI data are 
available only for this period. This has been a period of steady growth of domestic 
credit (as a share of GDP) in the region, which stabilized around 2005 for most of the 
sample countries (see Figure 1). The total number of observations for the period 
2001-2005 is summarized in Table 1 for each sample country. 
 
2.1. Leverage measures - descriptive statistics 
We use two different measures of leverage, generally dictated by the availability of 
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relevant data. First, we use the ratio of total debt (short and long-term debt) to total 
assets (abbreviated as TDTA). As an alternative, we use the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets (abbreviated as TLTA), which is available for a larger proportion of firms. 
Note that a large proportion of firms does not use any debt finance; thus the sample 
size is smaller when we use TDTA. While we do not observe market value of equity, 
there is information on book value of equity; there are however too many missing 
observations, rendering the use of this data very problematic.  
 Table 1 shows the average leverage ratios between 2001 and 2005 for our 
twelve sample countries, using the leverage measures described above. The table 
shows the average leverage ratios for two samples, “all firms” and “non-zero debt 
firms”. Given the limited use of external finance in some CEE countries, there is a 
significant proportion of firms with zero debt in our sample,4 notably in Romania. 
This reflects the fact that many firms still do not have access to debt markets in these 
economies and instead make heavy use of internal finance, trade credit and other 
kinds of liabilities.  
 Among all firms, the average ratio of total liabilities to total assets ranges 
between 0.34 (Slovenia) and 0.60 (Slovak Republic). The range for average debt 
ratios is however much narrower, namely between 0.02 (Romania) and 0.19 (Czech 
Republic). Since a significant proportion of firms in each of these countries do not 
have access to any debt, it may be pertinent to focus only on indebted firms (i.e., 
those with non-zero debt). The average debt ratio goes up somewhat when we 
consider the subsample of firms with non-zero debt. So caution needs to be exercised 
when choosing between samples (i.e., all firms versus non-zero debt firms) while 
analyzing and interpreting debt ratios.5  
                                                 
4 Note also that there are a number of cases when there was very little data for total debt in the sample countries, 
especially, Croatia and Slovenia (see Table 1). 
5 We have also experimented with alternative leverage measures, namely, debt and liability ratio net of cash-flow, 
which yielded rather comparable results to those presented here. 
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Table 2 shows debt ratio percentiles and the distribution of average debt ratios 
by firm size (proxied by total assets). Clearly, the debt ratios of firms in the lowest 
quartile are significantly lower than those in the top 5%-10% of the distribution in 
most sample countries. In fact the average debt ratio exceeds 1 for the top 1% firms 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Russia. While a large proportion of firms in the 
sample countries are deprived of loans, some firms seem to have access to high 
(maybe excessive) debt financing. Second, while the larger firms tend to have higher 
leverage in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Serbia, the Slovak 
Republic, the opposite holds for the other sample countries. The correlation between 
firm size and leverage, as shown in Table 2, suggests a significant positive correlation 
for Croatia, Serbia and The Slovak Republic while it is significantly negative for 
Poland, Russia and Ukraine; the correlation coefficient however remains insignificant 
for other sample countries.  
 
2.3. Financial institutions and  leverage – descriptive statistics 
It follows from our discussion in the last section that a high proportion of firms in the 
sample countries do not have any debt, and also that leverage is very high (maybe 
excessive) among non-zero debt firms. While much of the transition literature 
focuses on firm-level characteristics in understanding capital structure dynamics, we 
argue that the observed imbalance in the distribution  of leverage in our sample could 
be a sign of institutional weaknesses in debt issuance, management and recovery. This 
subsection thus briefly explores the link, if any, between selected institutional 
characteristics and leverage in our sample countries. 
Table 3 summarizes the average values of various financial and legal indices 
between 2001 and 2005, prepared using information from the EBRD, the World 
Bank FSDI indices and la Porta et al. (1998). Among others, the table includes 
measures of size, efficiency and stability of the banking sector, market capitalization 
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to GDP, share of foreign banks in total banking sector assets, and the quality of 
creditors’ rights.  Market capitalization to GDP is generally limited in most of the 
sample countries, especially in Bulgaria, Latvia, The Slovak Republic and Serbia. 
Firms’ external financing opportunities thus may depend crucially on the size and 
efficiency of the banking sector. The experience varies widely among the sample 
countries. Romania not only has the smallest banking sector, but efficiency of the 
banking sector is also the lowest in our sample. Compared to Romania, scores for 
average creditors’ rights are much higher in Serbia or Ukraine, which may facilitate 
the growth of debt financing. Another observation relates to the predominance of 
foreign banks in countries like Poland, Romania or Hungary as opposed to Slovenia, 
Ukraine or Russia, for example.  
Clearly, a more efficient banking sector is able to screen out bad loans while a 
greater degree of market capitalization not only offers an alternative source of 
external finance, but could also contribute to improved corporate governance 
practices. It is thus important to test whether the incidence of high leverage among 
sample firms is linked to weak financial institutions; in order to facilitate this analysis, 
we estimate a conventional model of optimal leverage.  
In particular, we determine the optimal leverage using the factors commonly 
identified in the literature as important determinants of leverage (e.g., see Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Driffield and Pal, 2010). Further, unlike 
most of the literature, we include two additional institutional measures, namely, 
efficiency of the banking sector and market capitalization as a share of GDP. 6  Once 
one allows for all these factors, the best estimate of optimal leverage is obtained from 
the following specification: 
                                                 
6 Note however that we were unable to find a measure of market to book ratio. Also, we tried to include total assets 
growth and also fixed assets as a share of total assets; however these variables were never significant in any specification 
and hence we decided to drop them. There could also be potential problem of multicollinearity between share of fixed 
assets and share of intangible fixed assets that we have included.  
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Leverageit = β0 + β1 log(assets)it-1 + β2 Ageit-1 +  β3 (Intangible 
FixedAssets/Total Asset)it-1 + β5 (EBIT/Total Assets)it-1 + β6 inflation it-1 + β7 
(bank efficiency) it-1 + β8 (Market capitalization rate) it-1 + β9 Industry 
Median Leveraget1+  νi + uit                                                                             
(1)7 
 
where i=1, 2,…, N refers to the i-th firm in period t=1, 2,…, T in our sample. νi is 
the firm-specific fixed effects while uit refers to i.i.d. errors. Definitions of these 
variables are provided in a note to Table 4. We use panel data fixed effects to 
estimate equation (1), using both debt and liability ratios as alternative measures of 
leverage. The advantage of fixed effects estimates is that it can minimize any potential 
estimation bias arising from  firm-specific time-invariant unobserved factors in the 
data. Potential simultaneity bias could also bias the estimates. Following much of the 
literature (e.g., see Driffield and Pal, 2010), we use lagged explanatory variables 
with a view to minimize this bias.  
The fixed effects estimates of leverage are summarized in Table 4. In general, 
more profitable firms tend to have lower leverage while firms in industries with 
higher median leverage tend to have higher leverage. The coefficient on market 
capitalization to GDP is positive, thus suggesting a premium for more capitalized 
firms in the loan market; the coefficient is however significant only when leverage is 
measured by the liability ratio. More interestingly, firms from countries with greater 
bank efficiency tend to have significantly lower leverage. In other words, there is 
evidence from this initial analysis that the more efficient banking system may restrict 
corporate leverage through regulation and supervision. In other words, other things 
remaining unchanged, excessive leverage in relation to assets could highlight 
institutional weaknesses.   
 
                                                 
7 EBIT stands for earnings before interest and taxes. 
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3. An Empirical Model of Leverage and TFP Growth  
The analysis so far has shown that while access to loans is limited for a significant 
proportion of firms in our sample, high (maybe excessive) leverage is common 
among firms with positive loans. It has also been established that the presence of high 
leverage is significantly related to the lower efficiency of the banking sector, other 
factors remaining unchanged. The central and final task in this paper is to examine 
the effect of leverage on firm performance measured by total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth. The underlying hypothesis is that while moderate levels of debt can 
stimulate TFP growth (through the financing of new technologies, innovation or new 
capacity), beyond a certain threshold debt becomes a drag on performance. There 
may be several explanations for this non-linear relationship between leverage and 
TFP growth. Overleveraged firms may have to focus on cash flow generation in 
order to service their debts, rather than continued improvements in productivity. 
Firms with very high debts may also be more vulnerable to unexpected adverse 
demand shocks and more likely to fall into financial distress following a shock. 
 In order to test this hypothesis one could possibly use a fixed-effects model to 
regress total factor productivity growth on leverage (and possibly its non-linear 
terms), after controlling for other covariates. But this may raise questions, especially 
because this conventional method does not allow one to endogenously determine the 
particular leverage level beyond which TFP growth is negatively affected by further 
increases in debt. As a better alternative, we employ the threshold regression analysis 
of Hansen (2000), which enables the endogenous identification of the threshold level of 
leverage beyond which further increases in leverage could lower TFP growth. We 
begin by examining this in the aggregate, and subsequently move on to some 
comparisons across countries, and across different types of firms.  
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3.1. Leverage and total factor productivity 
TFP estimates are generated using the well-knownLevinsohn-Petrin method 
(Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). The main endogeneity problem with total factor 
productivity is that firms anticipate shocks to productivity and accordingly adjust 
their behaviour. The econometrician only observes this ex post. The use of the 
Levinsohn-Petrin method allows us to address this problem (see Appendix ). Given 
that we were able to find industry-level price deflators for only 9 out of 12 of our 
sample countries, the TFP measure could only be constructed for these 9 countries, 
thus excluding firms from Croatia, Romania and Serbia from our original sample 
analyzed in section 2.  
 
3.2. An endogenous threshold model 
The threshold model is particularly relevant to test our central hypothesis, as it 
endogenously determines the existence and significance of one or more leverage 
thresholds (and the corresponding confidence intervals), which in turn allows us to 
assess the growth effects of leverage as a nonlinear process. Depending on whether 
leverage is less than, equal to, or greater than the threshold, we can obtain marginal 
effects associated with different bands of leverage and test whether the marginal 
effects are significantly different across bands. 
Denoting the leverage of the i-th firm in year t by Lit, the simplest threshold 
model for TFP growth of the i-th firm for the period [t, t+1] is as follows: 
ΔTFPit+1 = α1 Lit + β’Xit+νit  if  Lit ≤γ    (3a) 
 ΔTFPit+1 = α2 Lit + β’Xit+νit  if  Lit >γ    (3b) 
Combining (3a) and (3b), we write: 
 ΔTFPit+1 = β’Xit+α1 Lit I(Lit ≤γ) + α2 Lit I(Lit >γ)+νit  (4)  
where Lit is one period lagged value of leverage (i.e., debt or liability ratio) and Xit is 
12 
 
  
the set of lagged explanatory variables. I(.) represents an indicator function, 
indicating whether the leverage measure of the i-th firm at time t is less than, equal 
to, or greater than a threshold parameter  .   is the endogenous threshold value to 
be estimated from the model. The errors νit are assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed with mean zero and finite variance. Depending on whether the 
actual leverage is smaller, equal to, or larger than the threshold value ( ) to be 
estimated, observations are divided into two “regimes” where the regimes are 
distinguished by differing regression slopes, 1 and 2 .  
The central problem here is that threshold or cut-off value that has to be 
estimated is unknown, it has to be estimated, so that one cannot apply standard 
econometric theory of estimation. Hansen (2000) developed a distribution theory 
that allows one to make valid statistical inference on threshold models. 
Let Sn(β,α( )) represent the sum of squared errors for equation (4), where n 
is the sample size. Given that the parameters α depend on the threshold parameters 
 , we denote them by α( )). Because of this dependence, S(.) is not linear in the 
parameters but rather a step function where steps appear at some distinct values of 
the threshold variable  .  But conditional on a given threshold value, say  = 0, S(.) 
is linear in β and α. Accordingly, S(β,α( 0)) can be minimised to yield the 
conditional OLS estimates βˆ( 0) and αˆ( 0). Among all possible leverage values, 
the estimate of the threshold corresponds to that value of α, which minimises the 
sum of squared errors S(β,α( 0)) for given  =
0
. This minimisation problem is 
solved by a grid search over 393 leverage quantiles {1.00%, 1.25%, 1.50%, …, 
98.75%, 99%}. Once the sample splitting value of   is identified, the estimates of 
the slope parameters are readily available. 
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If a threshold effect is identified, i.e.., α1≠α2, one needs to form a confidence 
interval for the particular threshold value   in this context. This necessitates us to 
test the following null hypothesis:  
Ho : γ= γ0 
Under normality, the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic is routinely used in standard 
econometric applications to test for particular parametric values. But Hansen (2000) 
shows that LRn(γ) does not have a standard chi-square distribution in the threshold 
model. The correct distribution function and the appropriate asymptotic critical 
values need to be obtained from the bootstrapped standard errors (see Girma 2005 
for further details). 
Suppose that the two confidence limits of the threshold   are given 
respectively by  1 (lower) and  2 (upper). This allows us to define three sets of 
leverage variables as follows. Using debt ratio (TDTA) as the particular leverage 
measure, we generate tdta- (i.e., tdta≤ 1),  tdta= (i.e.,  1<tdta≤ 2) and tdta+ 
(i.e., tdta>  2); similarly using the liability ratio as an alternative leverage measure, 
we generate tlta- (i.e., tlta≤ 1), tlta= (i.e.,  1<tlta≤ 2) and tlta+ (i.e., tlta> 2). 
More generally, denoting leverage of i-th firm in year t by Lit, equation (4) is 
modified as follows: 
ΔTFPit+1 = α1 Lit I(Lit ≤γ1) + α2 Lit I( 1<Lit ≤ 2) +α3 Lit I(Lit > 2)+ β’Xit +νit 
           (5)  
In addition to different bands of leverage as shown in equation (5), we include one 
period lagged values of a number of other control variables Xit, namely, firm size 
(SME), age (Young), share of intangible assets (IFATA), ownership (foreign) and also 
some institutional characteristics, namely, efficiency of the banking sector and also 
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the extent of market capitalization to GDP.8 This is because the extent to which debt 
will act to restrict productivity growth is expected to vary with the size/efficiency of 
the financial market. The more effective the market, the less likely moral hazard 
would lead to excess leverage, and the lower the level of debt the firms may accrue 
before servicing the debt acts as a constraint. The set of lagged explanatory variables 
Xit also includes the lagged value of TFP as a control variable; significance of lagged 
TFP will capture the importance of Barro’s (1998) conditional convergence 
hypothesis. Use of lagged explanatory variables helps us to minimize the potential 
endogeneity bias of our estimates. It would however be difficult to address 
endogeneity this way, if there is a lot of persistence in the data. Persistence is not an 
issue in the total factor productivity models, as we use total factor productivity 
growth (and not the level variable). 
 The final step in this estimation strategy is to establish the asymptotic 
distribution of the slope coefficients. Although these parameters depend on the 
estimated threshold limits  1 and  2, Hansen (2000) demonstrates that this 
dependence is not of first-order asymptotic importance. Consequently, the usual 
distribution theory (i.e. asymptotically normal) can be applied to the estimated slope 
coefficients so that one could use the asymptotic p-values to test whether there is a 
significant threshold effect, i.e., if α1= α2= α3=0 ; rejection of the null hypothesis 
would confirm the presence of a significant threshold effect. 9 
  
3.3. Threshold estimates 
Our threshold estimates are summarized in Tables 5 and Table 6 for all firms and 
non-zero debt firms respectively. We estimate the 95% confidence interval for the 
threshold parameter  . The confidence interval varies somewhat for debt and liability 
                                                 
8 See note to Table 6 for variable definitions. 
9 This procedure is explained in detail in Girma et al. (2003) and Girma (2005).   
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ratios while they tend to be robust irrespective of the choice of the sample (all firms 
versus non-zero debt firms).  
Initial value of TFP is insignificant; thus there is no evidence of convergence in 
our sample. However all three leverage terms relating to different bands of the 
leverage thresholds are statistically significant and this holds irrespective of the choice 
of leverage measure, debt or liability ratio. There is thus evidence that, after 
controlling for all other factors, moderate leverage (leverage≤ 2) boosts TFP 
growth, while excessive leverage (leverage> 2) lowers it. Our estimates suggest 
that beyond a debt or liability ratio of around 40% further increases in leverage lower 
TFP growth. It is also evident that the marginal effect of an increase in leverage is 
significantly different for different bands of leverage and it decreases as we move 
from the lower leverage band to the higher one.  
 The role of institutional factors is also worth highlighting here. Higher 
efficiency of the banking sector and higher market capitalization are both associated 
with higher TFP growth, thus confirming the beneficial role of institutions on long-
run economic growth. The effect of intangible assets however turns out to be 
negative. While often intangible assets are taken to be a measure of R&D, they also 
include overvalued goodwill and patents (which may correspond to the expected 
future value of intangible assets). Thus it is not unusual for intangible assets to have a 
negative effect on TFP growth. 
The upper threshold level of leverage is about 40% of total assets irrespective 
of the choice of leverage measure. The results suggest that even if average TLTA is 
much higher than average TDTA, the distribution of these ratios in our sample is such 
that the two thresholds are rather similar, after controlling for all other factors. This 
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is perfectly possible as the threshold depends on who holds the liabilities and how 
efficient they are at monitoring bad loans.10  
 Given the possibility of reverse causation (i.e., more efficient firms may 
choose lower equity ratios and hence higher debt than others), we test the robustness 
of our estimates by differentiating between more/less efficient firms. In the absence 
of any better indicator, we consider profitability as an index of efficiency and classify 
firms according to their (a) profit margin and (b) return on capital employed. We 
consider two benchmark values for (a) and (b): (1) whether the firm has a  positive 
profit margin or rate of return on capital employed (ROCE) and (2) whether the 
firm has a profit margin or ROCE in excess of the median values in the sample 
(which are about 0.04 for both these variables). Threshold estimates for non-zero 
debt firms for “profitable” and “non-profitable” firms are shown in Table 7. As 
before, these estimates confirm the significant adverse effect of excessive leverage 
(beyond the upper threshold) on TFP growth. Naturally, the estimated threshold 
parameters are somewhat different for different subgroups of firms. The contrast 
between profitable and non-profitable firms is also interesting. First, the upper 
threshold value of leverage is higher for more profitable firms. Second, the marginal 
adverse effects of excess leverage on TFP growth are also different between these 
two groups of firms. The absolute marginal effect of excessive leverage is significantly 
higher for non-profitable firms, thus highlighting the significant adverse effect of 
excessive leverage on the productivity of non-profitable firms.  
Further, we split the sample by firm size (proxied by total assets) and the ratio 
of intangible assets to total assets, with a view to understand the impact of these firm 
characteristics on the leverage threshold. In each case, we estimate the threshold 
                                                 
10 For example, if they are held by suppliers who won’t supply any more inputs until you pay, or the electricity 
company who is about to turn you off if you don't pay, then this will bite earlier than a loan to a bank, that may or may 
not have particularly efficient process for keeping tabs on bad payers. 
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model using the subsamples of firms above the median firm size and median ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets. The threshold estimates for each case are summarized 
in Table 8. Each set of estimates confirms the adverse growth effect of excessive 
leverage for all different subgroups. In general, the upper threshold estimates are 
higher for ‘all’ firms rather than ‘all indebted’ firms. While the estimates for all 
larger firms (i.e., firms with more assets) are still around 40% of their assets, the 
estimate is somewhat higher for more innovative firms (i.e., firms with more 
intangible assets); in other words, more innovative firms can afford a higher leverage, 
which could partly be attributed to their higher growth potential, even after 
controlling for all other factors.  
Finally, we use the leverage threshold estimates to calculate the percentage of 
firms above the upper threshold for each sample country. We focus on non-zero debt 
firms, distinguishing profitable firms (those with above median profit margin) from 
others. Results of our analysis are summarized in Table 9. Clearly, a sizeable 
proportion of all non-zero debt firms in many sample countries tend to have debt ratios 
in excess of the upper threshold.  The proportion is significantly lower when we 
consider more profitable non-zero debt firms. Alarmingly, the proportion of firms 
with excess leverage is higher among non-profitable firms in most sample countries 
(with the exception of Slovenia). There is pronounced inter-country variation: 
considering all non-zero debt firms, the proportion of firms with excessive leverage 
is the highest in Russia, followed by Latvia and Bulgaria.  
  Our main conclusion is that while moderate leverage boosts TFP growth, 
excessive leverage beyond the upper threshold limit significantly lowers TFP growth. 
This result is robust across various subsamples. The estimated upper leverage limit is 
about 40% of assets irrespective of the leverage measure used, though it may vary 
somewhat depending on specific firm characteristics. Our analysis may therefore 
provide a useful tool to identify the point beyond which corporate indebtedness 
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becomes “excessive”. Unlike much of the macro literature, our analysis puts emphasis 
on the microeconomic aspects of credit booms, with specific focus on firms’ 
financing decisions and the potential relationship between excessive leverage and 
institutional characteristics.  
 
 
3.4. Implications for Financial Institutions 
Our sample countries are clearly heterogeneous in terms of efficiency of financial 
markets and institutions. Our analysis has particularly highlighted the impact of bank 
efficiency and market capitalization, not only on leverage (Table 5), but also on TFP 
growth (Tables 6-8). In order to explore the role of financial institutions further, we 
now estimate the threshold model for individual countries. Table 10  summarizes the 
threshold estimates for five of the nine sample countries, namely Bulgaria, Poland, 
Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. We were unable to obtain estimates for the remaining 
countries, as the grid search process failed to identify the sample-splitting value of the 
threshold; the sample sizes were too small to identify the thresholds with any degree 
of confidence (the confidence intervals were too wide). We do not show the full set 
of estimates for brevity, but they are available on request.  
Our central results remain unchanged in that moderate leverage continues to 
have a positive impact on TFP growth while excessive leverage (beyond the upper 
threshold limit) affects TFP growth negatively. These results hold for all five 
countries. Note, however, that the leverage thresholds tend to vary among these 
five countries: Serbia has the lowest (0.288) while Russia has the highest (0.514) 
leverage threshold in our sample. Given that these country-specific estimates are 
available only for 5 countries, it is hard to derive a definite relationship between 
financial institutions, as proxied by bank efficiency and market capitalization, and the 
estimated upper leverage threshold (above which TFP growth is affected negatively). 
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As a rule of thumb, we calculate the correlation between the country-specific 
threshold levels on the one hand and bank efficiency and market capitalization on the 
other for the 5 countries included in Table 10. While the correlation coefficients 
between bank efficiency and leverage threshold are negative (-0.15 and -0.26 
respectively for debt ratio and liability ratio), those between market capitalization 
and the threshold level turn out to be positive (0.85 and 0.81 respectively for debt 
and liability ratios) for non-zero debt firms in our sample. These simple correlation 
coefficients perhaps highlight several, possibly conflicting, channels affecting the 
relationship between selected indices of financial markets and the estimated leverage 
threshold.  For example, greater market efficiency means that loans are channeled to 
the "right" firms, i.e. those with positive NPV projects that can sustain higher debt 
levels without running into difficulties (positive impact on upper threshold). In 
contrast, investors (be it banks or shareholders) in more efficient markets may start 
imposing discipline earlier, thus resulting in a negative impact on upper threshold 
(e.g., see ‘Bad Management hypothesis’ in Berger et al., 1997). A thorough analysis 
of these channels is however beyond the scope of the present paper – but we hope 
future research will shed light in this respect. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
While lending booms are a natural outcome of financial and economic development, 
it is important for policy makers to identify the point beyond which corporate 
indebtedness becomes “excessive”. Our analysis is a first step towards a more 
microeconomic approach to the study of debt sustainability. The threshold approach 
may contribute towards the development of tools to monitor the emergence of 
pockets of excessive leverage in the economy. It may also help identify firms and 
sectors of the economy that need to go through a deleveraging process following the 
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financial crisis. Indeed, it is important that “virtuous” firms, possibly those with high 
but sustainable levels of debt, are not deprived of external finance.  
 Unlike much of the existing macro literature, our analysis puts emphasis on 
the microeconomic aspects of lending booms, in particular firms’ financing decisions, 
the potential relationship between excess leverage and institutional characteristics, 
and most importantly, the link between corporate leverage and TFP growth, a topic 
that remains virtually unexplored. We explore these issues using firm-level panel 
data from a group of CEE emerging economies. 
We posit a non-linear relationship between leverage and total factor 
productivity growth.  While moderate leverage can stimulate TFP growth through 
providing finance for new technologies, innovation or new capacity, beyond a certain 
threshold further increases in leverage become a drag on performance. We use a 
threshold model (a la Hansen, 2000) to endogenously determine the existence and 
significance of threshold effects of leverage on TFP growth with a view to test our 
central hypothesis. Threshold estimates identify an upper threshold limit (about 40% 
of total assets) beyond which further increases in leverage could adversely affect TFP 
growth in the sample. Results are robust and hold not only in the full sample, but 
also in various subsamples including large firms, firms with more intangible assets as 
well as more profitable firms. It is worth noting that the adverse effects of excessive 
leverage are particularly high for non-profitable firms. The results also suggest that 
the leverage threshold varies across countries characterized by different levels of 
financial development, thus highlighting a possible role of financial institutions on 
leverage imbalance. Evidence of excessive leverage may reflect microeconomic 
inefficiencies in credit allocation among firms in the sample countries, especially 
those with weaker financial markets and institutions. There seems to be a need to 
further deepen and improve the quality of financial systems in CEE countries. A 
thorough study of the role of institutions is however beyond the scope of the current 
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paper and we hope future research will address this topic. Although this is a study of 
firms in CEE countries, results of our analysis may have wider implications for 
countries with weak institutions beyond this region. 
22 
 
  
References 
Almeida, H, M. Capello and M. Weisbach. (2005) ‘Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash’, The Journal of 
Finance, vol.59, issue 4, 1777 – 1804. 
Antoniou, A., Y. Guney and K. Poudiyal. (2008). ‘The Determinants of Capital Structure: Capital 
Market Oriented Versus Bank Oriented Institutions’, Journal of Finance and Quantitative 
Analysis 43(1).  
Barros, R. (1998) ‘Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Analysis’, MIT Press. 
Beck, T, A. Demirgüc-Kunt and V. Maksimovic. (2002). ‘Financing Patterns Around the World: 
The Role of Institutions’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2905. 
Berger, A.N. and D.B. Humphrey. 1992. ‘Measurement and Efficiency Issues in Commercial 
Banking’ in Z. Griliches (ed.) ‘Output Measurement in the Service Sectors’, NBER studies 
in Income and Wealth, Vol. 56, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 245-79.  
Berger, A., J.K. Johnson, W. Qinyu and R. De Young. 1997. ‘Problem Loans and Cost Efficiency 
in Commercial Banks’, Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 849-870. 
Berger, A. and di Patti, E. B. (2006). ‘Capital structure and firm performance: a new approach to  
testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry’, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 30(4) 1065-1102. 
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler. 1995. ‘Inside the Blackbox: Credit Channel of Monetary Policy 
Transmission’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, 27-48. 
Bonin, J. P. Wachtel and I. Hasan. (2005). ‘Privatization Matters: Bank Efficiency in Transition 
Countries’, Journal of Banking and Finance 29(8/9) 2155-2178. 
Booth, L. V. Aivazian, A. Demirgüc-Kunt and V. Maksimovic. (2001). ‘Capital Structure in 
Developing Countries’, Journal of Finance, 56. 
De Haas R. and M. Peters. (2004). ‘The Dynamic Adjustment Towards Target Caital Structures of 
Firms in Transition Economies’, EBRD working paper No. 87. 
Demirgüc-Kunt, A. and V. Maksimovic. (1995) ‘Stock Market Development and Firm Financing 
Choices’, Policy Research Working Paper 1461, The World Bank, Policy Research 
Department, Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Washington DC.  
Driffield, N. and S. Pal. (2010) ‘Evolution of Capital Structure in East Asia: Corporate Inertia or 
Endeavours?, Journal of Royal Statistical Society (Series A), 173(1), 1–29. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and V Maksimovic. (1998). Law, Finance, and Firm Growth, The Journal of 
Finance, 1998 - Blackwell Synergy. 
EBRD (2009) Transition Report 2009: Transition in Crisis? 
Evans, D.S. (1987) ‘Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth’, The Journal of Political Economy, 
1987, vol. 95(4). 
Faria, A. and Paolo Mauro (2004) “Institutions and the External Capital Structure of Countries”, 
IMF Working Paper WP/04/236. 
Fischer, E.O., Heinkel,R., Zechner,J. (1989) ‘Dynamic capital structure choice: theory and tests’. 
Journal of Finance, 44, 19 –40.  
Flannery, M.J. and K. Rangan. (2006) ‘Partial Adjustment Toward Target Capital Structures’, 
Journal of Financial Economics 79, 469-506. 
Frank, M. and B. Goyal. (2009). ‘Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors are Reliably 
Important?" (with Murray Z. Frank), Financial Management, 38(1), 1-37. 
Girma, S. (2005). ‘Absorptive Capacity and Productivity Spillovers from FDI: A Threshold  
Regression Analysis’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 67(3) 281-306. 
23 
 
  
Girma,S., M. Henry, R. Kneller and C. Milner (2003)Threshold and Interaction Effects in the  
Openness-Productivity Growth Relationship: The Role of Institutions and Natural Barriers 
GEP working paper 2003/32, Nottingham. 
Goldstein, R., N. Ju and H. Leland. (2001) An EBIT based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure’, 
Journal of Business 74(4). 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, Rodrigo Valdes, and Oscar Landerretche, 2001,  “Lending Booms: 
Latin America and the World.” Economia, Spring, pp. 47-99. 
Greenspan, A. (2002). Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan Federal Reserve Board’s Semi 
Annual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress Before the Committee on Financial 
Services, US House of Representatives February 27. 
Griffith, R. (1999). Using the ARD establishment level data to look at foreign ownership  
and productivity in the United Kingdom. Economic Journal, 109, 416-42. 
Hansen, B. E. (2000). ‘Sample splitting and threshold estimation’, Econometrica, Vol. 68, 
575–603. 
Hovakimian, A., G. Hovakimian., and H. Tehranian (2004) ‘Determinants of target capital 
structure: The case of dual debt and equity issues’. Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 71 
(3), 517-540.  
Kyotaki, N. and J. Moore. (1997). ‘Credit Cycles’, Journal of Political Economy, 105, 211-248.  
Lang, L., E. Ofek and R. M. Stulz (1996) “Leverage, investment, and firm growth”,  
Journal of Financial Economics,  40, 3-29. 
Levinsohn, J. and Petrin, A. (2003). Estimating production functions using Inputs to  control 
for unobservables. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 317-341. 
Mendoza, Enrique G.  and Marco E. Terrones (2008), “An Anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence  
 From Macro Aggregates and Micro Data” IMF Working Paper WP/08/226.Myers, S.C. 
(1984) ‘Capital Structure Puzzles’, Journal of Finance, 39, 575-92. 
Myers, S.C. and N. Majluf. (1984). ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms 
Have Information Investors do not Have, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.  
Nivrozhkin, E. (2005). ‘The Dynamics of Capital Structure in Transition Economies’, Economics of 
Planning. 
Olley, S. and Pakes, A. (1996). The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications  
 Equipment Industry. Econometrica, 64 (6), 1263-98. 
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales. (1995) ‘What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some evidence 
from international data,’ Journal of Finance, 50, 1421-1460.  
Rogoff, K. (1999). "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, 13(4), 2.  
Sarkar, S. and F. Zapatero. (2003). 'The Trade-off Model with Mean Reverting Earnings: Theory 
and Empirical Tests', Economic Journal. 
Strebulaev, I. (2007). ‘Do Tests of Capital Structure Theory Mean What They Say?’, Journal of 
Finance 62, 1747-1788. 
24 
 
 
Table 1: Cross-country variation in leverages 2001-2005  
 
    
All firms  
Non-zero debt 
firms 
 
    
TLTA  TDTA  
 
TLTA TDTA 
Country 
Firms Total 
Obs. 
Obs. With 
zero debt 
(%) 
Obs. with 
missing debt 
info (%)  Mean SD Mean SD 
 
Mean 
Mean 
Bulgaria 207 1035 18.2  (17.7) 0.59 0.94 0.18 0.33 0.62 0.24 
Croatia 129 645 7.3  (86.7) 0.39 0.22 0.06 0.13 0.37 0.13 
Czech  68 340 12.6  (28.8) 0.52 0.66 0.19 0.32 0.58 0.23 
Hungary 22 110 16.4  (43.6) 0.40 0.21 0.09 0.12 0.43 0.13 
Latvia 26 130 10.8  (31.5) 0.49 0.53 0.18 0.20 0.55 0.22 
Poland 162 810 25.3  (39.1) 0.53 0.35 0.10 0.13 0.56 0.16 
Romania 51 255 78.4  (6.3) 0.45 0.32 0.02 0.06 0.47 0.11 
Russia 415 2075 11.6  (31.6) 0.42 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.69 0.24 
Serbia 289 1445 13.7  (2.5) 0.37 0.23 0.12 0.15 0.39 0.14 
Slovak Republic 119 595 6.9  (20.0) 0.60 1.57 0.12 0.13 0.59 0.13 
Slovenia 65 325 0.9  (90.8) 0.34 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.40 0.07 
Ukraine 159 795 17.0  (1.1) 0.42 0.26 0.13 0.16 0.45 0.15 
All   21.6  0.49 1.92 0.14 0.24 0.52 0.18 
Note: TL/TA is the total liability as a share of total assets while TD/TA is total debt (both short and long-run) to total assets.  
Source: Authors’ own calculation using Orbis data. 
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Table 2: Distribution of debt ratio among  firms with positive debt, 2001-2005  
 Leverage percentiles Average leverage by size (by total assets) 
Country 
25% 50% 
75% 90% 95% 
99% Small & medium 
firms 
Large Correlation 
(size, leverage) 
Bulgaria 0.05 0.13 0.28 0.53 0.70 1.55 0.22 0.25 -0.0213 
Croatia 0.013 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.42 0.83 0.06 0.18 0.304* 
Czech Republic 0.045 0.14 0.27 0.40 0.97 2.19 0.20 0.25 0.013 
Hungary 0.009 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.65 0.13 0.13 -0.054 
Latvia 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.52 0.71 0.82 0.27 0.19 -0.163 
Poland 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.36 0.44 0.68 0.18 0.15 -0.147* 
Romania 0.015 0.07 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.70 0.09 0.12 0.163 
Russia 0.06 0.15 0.33 0.51 0.61 1.3 0.27 0.19 -0.19* 
Serbia 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.35 0.44 0.65 0.12 0.16 0.217* 
Slovak Republic 0.033 0.096 0.18 0.30 0.38 0.64 0.11 0.15 0.153* 
Slovenia 0.032 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.20 - 0.07 0.270 
Ukraine 0.036 0.10 0.22 0.38 0.47 0.72 0.17 0.15 -0.093* 
Source: Authors’ own calculation using Orbis data. 
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Table 3. Financial institutions in CEE countries 2001-2005 
 
COUNTRY 
[1] Size of 
the banking 
sector 
[1] Efficiency 
of the 
banking 
sector 
[1] 
Stability 
of the 
banking 
sector 
[1] Equity 
market 
efficiency 
[3] Market 
capitalization  
to GDP 
[2] 
Creditors’ 
rights 
[3] Share of 
foreign 
banks 
[3] Bank 
reform 
[3] 
Competition 
reform 
Bulgaria 4.84 5.51 4.64 6.68 8.74 2.00 77.34 3.40 2.38 
Croatia 5.76 4.89 4.42 NA 23.69 3.00 89.64 3.74 2.30 
Czech Republic 5.35 4.72 5.01 3.55 22.69 3.00 86.10 3.76 2.94 
Hungary 5.21 5.37 4.70 4.23 23.51 1.00 76.12 4.00 3.12 
Latvia 4.71 5.34 3.47 4.78 10.38 3.00 53.50 3.62 2.60 
Poland 5.07 5.67 5.04 5.03 20.77 1.00 72.00 3.38 3.06 
Romania 3.95 4.23 4.69 3.85 11.03 1.67 55.36 2.82 2.30 
Russian Federation 4.5 5.04 
 
4.82 3.00 46.59 1.67 8.04 2.00 2.30 
Serbia NA 4.51 NA NA 10.17 2.00 36.46 2.12 1.00 
Slovak Republic 5.52 4.76 6.07 NA 7.84 2.00 90.54 3.46 3.12 
Slovenia 5.43 5.09 3.77 4.55 23.38 3.00 18.74 3.30 2.70 
Ukraine 4.49 4.68 2.05 NA 12.12 2.00 2.30 13.98 3.32 
[1]: Source: FSDI, World Bank. [2] Source: La Porta et al. [3] Source EBRD. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Leverage: Fixed effects estimates of debt and liability ratios 
VARIABLES Debt ratio Liability ratio 
Total assets 0.00520 -0.0178 
 (0.00612) (0.0121) 
young -0.00268 -0.00976 
 (0.0114) (0.0227) 
Intangible assets -0.0643 -0.0134 
 (0.107) (0.214) 
Profitability -0.121*** -0.646*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0434) 
Industry median 0.118*** 0.288*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0676) 
Bank efficiency -0.0157** -0.0563*** 
 (0.00646) (0.0127) 
Market capitalisation 0.000129 0.00132* 
 (0.000347) (0.000681) 
inflation 0.00308*** 0.00174 
 (0.000902) (0.00180) 
Intercept 0.142** 0.937*** 
 (0.0686) (0.136) 
F-statistic 18.39 34.46 
Observations 3041 3189 
R-squared 0.038 0.135 
Number of id1 1144 1201 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Total assets are measured in USD thousands; fixed assets are measured in USD 
thousands. Intangible assets are the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is measured as the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) 
to total assets. Bank efficiency refers to the FSDI Index (1-5) of banking sector efficiency where a higher value means greater efficiency. Market capitalization rate 
is the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP (in %). Inflation refers to the CPI inflation (in %). Source: Authors’ own calculation using Orbis data. 
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Table 5. Threshold estimation of determinants of TFP growth (all firms)  
      
Variable (1) Coefficient t-statistic Variable (2) Coefficient t-statistic 
Initial TFP 0.126699 0.959595 Initial TFP 0.127223 0.960581 
TDTA>0.404 -0.024226 -3.21458** TLTA>0.412 -0.204268 -2.40342** 
0.322<TDTA<0.404 0.089215 2.930289** 0.348<TLTA<0.412 0.058413 1.915012* 
TDTA<0.322 0.350741 1.82689* TLTA<0.348 0.394431 2.36437** 
Small/Medium firms 0.143156 2.77914** Small/Medium firms 0.147616 2.88400** 
Young firms -3.34E-03 -0.077172 Young firms -6.97E-03 -0.161321 
Foreign firms 0.280277 1.38231 Foreign firms 0.295057 1.45004* 
Intangible assets -2.26983 -3.71606** Intangible assets -2.1469 -3.52047** 
Bank efficiency 0.095357 2.57299** Bank efficiency 0.092482 2.49775** 
Market capitalisation 0.010349 4.02834** Market capitalisation 0.010322 4.01593** 
Intercept 0.449349 1.60934* Intercept 0.365951 1.29955 
Sector Yes  Sector Yes  
R-square 0.042  R-square 0.039  
95% CI for γ 0.322-0.404  95% CI for γ 0.348-0.412  
 
Note: * denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes the same at 1% or lower level. See note to Table 4 for variable definitions. A firm is defined 
as young if it is incorporated in or after 1995.These estimates are based on data from 9 of the sample countries and exclude firms from Croatia, Romania and 
Serbia. This is because we could not find industry-level deflators for these countries and hence we could not calculate the TFP residuals.  
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Table 6. Threshold estimation of determinants of TFP growth (non-zero debt firms)  
 
 
 
 
Note: Note: * denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes the same at 1% or lower level. See notes to Table 4 for variable definitions. 
These estimates are based on data from 9 of the sample countries and exclude firms from Croatia, Romania and Serbia. This is because we could not find industry-
level deflators for these countries and hence we could not calculate the TFP residuals.  
 
 
 
Variable (1) Coefficient t-statistic Variable (2) Coefficient t-statistic 
Initial TFP 0.155852 1.06343 Initial TFP 0.168956 1.14858 
TDTA>0.399 -0.438213 -4.22543** TLTA>0.406 -0.279262 -5.21194** 
0.318<TDTA<0.399 0.088776 2.468972** 0.354<TLTA<0.406 0.084452 2.62755** 
TDTA<0.318 0.23567 3.118497** TLTA<0.406 0.585551 4.25187** 
Small/Medium firms 0.203393 3.64635** Small/Medium firms 0.202249 3.67908** 
Young firms -0.02566 -0.577607 Young firms -0.017047 -0.387835 
Foreign firms 0.421101 1.96136** Foreign firms 0.437864 2.03162** 
Intangible assets -1.79247 -2.86757** Intangible assets -1.6335 -2.64248** 
Bank efficiency 0.074301 1.87058* Bank efficiency 0.070297 1.79326* 
Market capitalisation 9.31E-03 3.35352** Market capitalisation 9.87E-03 3.59513** 
Intercept 0.409825 1.35935 Intercept 0.231641 0.766973 
Sector Yes  Sector Yes  
R-square 0.054  R-square 0.04  
95% CI for γ2 0.318-0.399  95% CI for γ2 0.354-0.406  
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Table 7. Threshold estimation of determinants of TFP growth for profitable and non-profitable firms with positive debt:  
 
 
 Firms with 
profit<0.04  
 Firms with 
profit >0.04  
 firms with 
ROCE<0.04  
Firms with 
ROCE 
>0.04  
         
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic
  
Initial TFP 0.0271 0.1513 0.2294 1.3229 0.0135 0.0755 0.2279 1.3169 
TDTA+ -0.5982 -3.0784** -0.0227 -3.2838** -0.7655 -4.187** -0.1421 -3.1335** 
TDTA= 0.5340 2.2141** -0.0531 -1.5035 -0.0043 -0.0094 0.1067 2.5672** 
TDTA- 0.2419 3.5171** 0.1596 2.1746 0.5536 2.0419** 0.2776 1.45586* 
Small/medium firms 0.11553 0.9091 0.1561 2.7733** 0.1223 2.9300** 0.1593 2.8338** 
YOUNG firms -0.2041 -1.7376* 0.0077 0.1814 -0.2084 -1.7157* 0.0076 0.1800 
FOREIGN firms 0.1367 0.5405 0.6022 2.4505** 0.1272 0.5062 0.5997 2.4458** 
Intangible assets -0.2763 -0.1099 -1.5836 -3.00466** 0.0953 0.0373 -1.7853 -3.3797** 
Bank efficiency 0.2745 2.2474** 0.039713 1.1451 0.2648 2.0524** 0.0381 1.0977 
Market 
capitalisation 
0.0097 1.0607 0.0088 3.56645** 0.00688 0.711086 0.0084 3.4425** 
Sector Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Intercept -0.4250 -0.7062 0.5280 1.5874* -0.2747 -0.4455 0.5668 1.7083* 
R-square 0.078  0.063  0.048  0.068  
threshold 0.224  0.577  0.425  0.522  
threshold range 0.187-
0.301  0.509-0.624  0.354-0.496  0.453-0.616  
Note:  These estimates use effects of debt ratio on TFP growth. * denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes the same at 1% or lower level. See 
note to Table 4 for variable definitions. These estimates are based on data from 9 of the sample countries and exclude firms from Croatia, Romania and Serbia. This is because we 
could not find industry-level deflators for these countries and hence we could not calculate the TFP residuals. TDTA+, TLTA+ refer to values of leverage in excess of the upper 
threshold; TDTA=, TLTA= refer to the values of leverage between the upper and lower threshold while TDTA-, TLTA refer to the values of leverage below the lower threshold. 
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Table 8.  Threshold estimates of selected sub-samples  
 
Case 1 
Firm size 
All larger firms All indebted larger firms   All larger firms All indebted larger firms  
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
TDTA+ -0.0215 -3.8615 -0.4616 -4.6344 TLTA+ -0.231 -2.517 -0.3242 -5.6294 
TDTA= 0.0845 3.2176 0.0874 2.7003 TLTA= 0.0697 1.8198 0.0945 2.9145 
TDTA- 0.3421 1.9773 0.2142 3.3905 TLTA- 0.4495 2.3502 0.5741 4.7187 
95% CI to 
threshold 
0.321-0.403 0.317-0.334 95% CI to 
threshold 
0.337-0.407 0.361-0.399 
Case 2 
Intangibles 
All firms with high 
intangibles 
All indebted firms with 
high intangibles 
 All firms with high 
intangibles 
All indebted firms with high 
intangibles 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
TDTA+ -0.0251 -3.0788 -0.4531 -3.71 TLTA+ -0.2003 -2.3491 -0.2632 -6.2404 
TDTA= 0.1043 2.7073 0.0853 2.1686 TLTA= 0.0631 1.8018 0.0809 2.9414 
TDTA- 0.3586 1.5929 0.2615 3.1402 TLTA- 0.3544 2.785 0.6861 4.8787 
95% CI to 
threshold 
0.458-0.504 0.364-0.447 95% CI to 
threshold 
0.401-0.442 0.392-0.426 
  
Note. TDTA refers to debt ratio while TLTA refers to liability ratio. TDTA+, TLTA+ refer to values of leverage in excess of the upper threshold; 
TDTA=, TLTA= refer to the values of leverage between the upper and lower threshold while TDTA-, TLTA- refer to the values of leverage below 
the lower threshold. CI refers to confidence interval. Other control variables are same as in Table 6.
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Table 9. Percentage distribution of indebted firms with excess leverage   
 
 All non-zero debt firms 
Profitable non-zero debt firms 
(by profit margin) 
Non-profitable non-zero debt firms  
(by profit margin) 
Country Debt ratio γ2> 0.399 Debt ratio γ2> 0.577 debt ratio γ2>0.301 
Bulgaria 0.1657          0.0226 
0.0798 
Czech Republic 0.1055          0.0101 
0.0503 
Hungary 0.0455          0.0000 
0.0227 
Latvia 0.1733          0.0133 
0.0533 
Poland 0.0625          0.0069 
0.0104 
Russian Federation 0.1959          0.0348 
0.0365 
Slovak Republic 0.0322          0.0092 
0.0115 
Slovenia 0.00          0.0000 
0.000 
Ukraine 0.0864          0.0108 
0.0278 
 
Note:  These estimates make use of the threshold parameters obtained in Tables 6 (all non-zero debt firms) and 7 (profitable and non-profitable firms). 
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Table 10.  Inter-country variation in threshold estimates for debt and liability ratios: Selected estimates (95% confidence 
intervals between brackets) 
   Debt ratio Liability ratio 
 Bank 
efficiency 
Market 
capitalization 
(1) All firms (2) Non-zero 
debt firms 
(3) All firms (4) Non-zero 
debt firms 
Bulgaria 5.51 8.74 0.354 (0.307, 0.387) 0.307 (0.288, 
0.367) 
0.354 (0.310, 0.366) 0.339 (0.269, 
0.384) 
Poland 5.07 20.77 0.409  (0.366, 0.437) 0.388 (0.344, 
0.441) 
0.399 (0.328, 0.451) 0.415 (0.377, 
0.463) 
Romania       
Russia 5.04 46.6 0.514 (0.439, 0.570) 0.529 (0.446, 
0.604) 
0.514 (0.491, 0.561) 0.547 (0.449, 
0.674) 
Serbia 4.51 10.2 0.288 (0.266, 0.344) 0.327 (0.276, 
0.388) 
0.347 (0.310, 0.397) 0.377 (0.354, 
0.406) 
Ukraine 4.68 12.12 0.461 (0.377, 0.503) 0.442 (0.394, 
0.505) 
0.439 (0.399, 0.488) 0.483 (0.450, 
0.509) 
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the average values of indices of bank efficiency and market capitalization. Column (3) shows the estimate of leverage 
threshold and also the lower and upper limits of the leverage threshold (in the parentheses) for debt and liability ratio for all firms as well as indebted 
firms only. 
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Figure 1. Growth of domestic credit to GDP in the CEE region 
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Appendix 1 
 
         
Appendix  
 
Calculation of TFP 
 
The approach and methodology are well developed and adopted from the existing literature (see e.g., Griffith 1999). This essentially involves 
estimating the following basic production function: 
 
  (A1) 
 
where subscripts i, t refer to firm and year; yit, kit, lit, and mit represent the logarithm of a firm’s output (sales) and the production inputs: capital 
(measured as the book value of fixed assets), labour (number of employees) and material costs respectively. We estimate it  from (1) as TFP and 
then determine the log(TFP). To deflate monetary values we use the appropriate producer price index for each manufacturing industry and consumer 
price index for services available from EU-KLMS (Gottingen) and also WWII (Vienna).  
One of the most common econometric problems with the estimation of TFP concerns endogeneity, when regressors and the error terms 
become correlated. This is because at least a part of the TFP will be observed by the firm at a time early enough so as to allow the firm to change the 
factor input decision. If that is the case, then profit maximization implies that the realisation of the error term is expected to influence the decision on 
factor inputs. Consequently the OLS estimates could turn out to be inconsistent. As an alternative we use Levinsohn-Petrin correction, who extend 
Olley and Pakes (1996) approach by using material inputs as a proxy to control for unobservable productivity shocks, as it is more common for firms 
to register material costs every year. Accordingly, we generate two series TFP and TFP_LP using the standard and Levinsohn-Petrin methods 
respectively, although TFP_LP remains our preferred measure. 
 
